












































































































































































































































This paper tests for the hypothesis that institutional integration interacts with economic integration at
the regional level. In particular, we ask what lessons can be drawn from the European experience with
regional integration for Latin America. Several indicators of institutional and economic integration for
both the EU and Latin America are presented.  We find that Latin America is currently less
economically integrated not only than the European Union today, but in some cases even than the EU
at the beginning of its regional integration process. A cluster analysis illustrates that the link between
institutional and economic integration has worked both ways throughout the whole EU experience.
The more institutional integration went beyond the creation of a customs union and moved towards a
common market and an economic and monetary union, the deeper economic integration turned out.
Increasing economic integration in turn corroborated and sustained the process of institutional
integration.
JEL classification: [E42, F15, F33 and F41]




Latin American countries are currently confronted with two main options concerning their
prospects for regional integration. The first option relates to the choice of partners. Costs and benefits
of so-called “South-South” arrangements – i.e., intra-regional arrangements such as the Common
Market of the South (Mercosur) – need to be compared with those of “North-South” arrangements -
i.e., inter-regional arrangements such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The second
option, not mutually exclusive with the first, regards the depth of integration: the desirability of free
trade arrangements has to be weighed vis-à-vis deeper forms of integration, such as a common market
or even a monetary union at some point in time, which is likely to be more complex.
Assuming that deeper regional integration is one of the possible scenarios for Latin America,
this paper asks what lessons can be drawn from the European experience that started in the 1950s. We
contribute to this growing debate by testing the hypothesis that institutional integration has interacted
with economic integration at a regional level. An original measure of institutional integration is
developed and presented here. It comprises five main institutional stages: free trade area, custom
unions, common market, economic union and total economic integration (in which some economic
policies are conducted at the supranational level). Economic integration is captured by several
measures of real, financial and monetary integration as also suggested by the optimum currency area
(OCA) theory. They include measures of the synchronisation of the business cycle, convergence of
inflation rates, exchange rate variability, trade openness and integration, convergence of interest rates,
and income convergence.
The paper finds that Latin America currently fulfils these OCA criteria to a lesser extent than
the European Union (EU) today, but in most cases even to a lesser extent than the EU in the 1960s and
1970s. By means of a cluster analysis the paper shows that the link between institutional and economic
integration has worked both ways throughout the whole EU experience. The more institutional
integration went beyond the creation of a customs union and moved towards a common market and an
economic and monetary union, the deeper economic integration turned out. Increasing economic
integration, in turn, corroborated and sustained the process of institutional integration.
The key lesson from the European experience that this paper draws for Latin America is,
therefore, that intensifying regional institutional integration indeed plays an important role in
deepening and accelerating the process of regional economic integration. The importance of deepening
institutional integration for economic integration in Europe can be taken as a valuable example for the
future path of integration in Latin America. However, it should be emphasised that each process of
regional integration towards ever-advanced stages takes time and entails a strong, and sustained,
political commitment. For example, monetary unification among several European countries has
required more than 25 years from the first efforts of exchange rate stabilisation in the 1970s. An
equally important lesson is that, while deeper economic integration calls for an effective institutional
framework, the institutional development is in turn feasible only if the process of economic integration
sustains it.
While the analysis in the paper may be extended in several ways, a few policy implications
can already be drawn from the results of this paper. In particular, the European experience suggests
that the currently modest level of economic integration in Latin America could be interpreted as an
early stage of a process of deepening regional integration. In particular, such integration would be
more likely to succeed in Latin America to the extent that realistic objectives are set in line with the
current regional economic conditions and the prevailing level of political commitment. In this regard,
the European experience shows that a concerted effort towards regional integration in Latin America




1.    Introduction
Latin American countries are currently confronted with two main options concerning their
prospects for regional integration. The first option relates to the choice of partners. Costs and benefits
of so-called “South-South” arrangements – i.e., intra-regional arrangements such as the Common
Market of the South (Mercosur) – need to be compared with those of “North-South” arrangements –
i.e., inter-regional arrangements such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The second
option regards the depth of integration: the desirability of free trade arrangements has to be weighed
vis-à-vis deeper forms of integration, which are likely to be more costly and lengthy to undertake.
These two options -- i.e., the choice of partner and the depth of integration -- are not mutually
exclusive, but may complement each other over time. As argued, for instance, in World Bank (2000)
and Scandizzo (2002), North-South arrangements may be preferable if their objective is only the
establishment of a free trade area
1, whereas South-South arrangements may bring substantial benefits
provided that they pursue the liberalisation of factor movement, policy harmonisation and policy co-
ordination.
2 For Latin America this would imply that, first, developing relations with partners in the
region can go hand in hand with trade liberalisation vis-à-vis other parts of the world; and second, that
regional integration could go beyond, or much beyond, trade liberalisation.
3
The main goal of this paper is to test for the hypothesis that institutional integration interacts
with economic integration at the regional level. In particular, we ask what lessons can be drawn from
the European experience with regional integration for Latin America. We proceed by first measuring
and comparing several indicators of institutional and economic integration for both the EU and Latin
America. Institutional integration can be defined as the outcome of joint policy decisions designed to
affect the depth and breadth of regional integration over time. The paper develops and presents an
original measure of institutional integration, based on the classification of regional integration
developed by Balassa (1961). Economic integration is captured by several measures of real, financial
and monetary integration in a given region. In particular, we look at a number of variables suggested
by the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. These include measures of the synchronisation of the
business cycle, convergence of inflation rates, exchange rate variability, trade openness and
integration, convergence of interest rates, and income convergence.
By employing a cluster analysis the paper then tackles a series of inter-related questions. How
integrated are the economies within Europe and within Latin America? Can one identify homogenous
groups of countries within regions? And if so, what makes countries within groups similar? How did
real and nominal economic integration proceed over time?
To our knowledge, this approach -- based on the analysis of the relationship between
institutional and economic integration -- is a rather novel one.
4  In recent years a rich literature has
examined different aspects of economic policies in the Latin American region.  Calvo and Mendoza
(1997) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1997) have examined the sustainability of current accounts
imbalances and fiscal policies in Latin American countries. Another branch of literature has focussed
on the choice of exchange rate arrangements and the timing of monetary union in Latin America: see
for example Eichengreen (1998), Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2000), and Fratianni and Hauskrecht
(2002). Alberola, Busián and Fernández de Lis (2002) discuss the links between economic integration,
macroeconomic stability and structural reforms.  García Herrero and Santillán (2002) assess and
compare the degree of financial sector development across Latin American countries. Hochreiter,
                                                          
1 South-South free trade arrangements would in fact entail trade diversion from more efficient exporters outside the region to
less efficient regional producers.
2 South-South arrangements may benefit from deeper regional integration in terms of economies of scale, competition effects
and improved resource allocation.
3 This view is currently mirrored both in Latin American countries’ interest in pursuing trade agreements with the NAFTA
and the EU, and in the final objectives of the various Latin American sub-regional arrangements.
4 Ben-David (1993) uses quite a similar approach, but he only focuses on the link between the timing of trade reform and
income convergence among countries.	
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Schmidt-Hebbel and Winkler (2002) discuss the issue of the long-run sustainability of a monetary
union in Latin America vis-à-vis the European experience.
As one would have expected, Latin America currently fulfils the optimum currency area
(OCA) criteria to a lesser extent not only than the European Union (EU) today, but ins some cases
even than the EU at the beginning of its regional integration process.
5 The cluster analysis shows that
the link between institutional and economic integration has worked both ways throughout the whole
EU experience. The more institutional integration went beyond the creation of a customs union and
moved towards a common market and an economic and monetary union, the deeper economic
integration turned out. Increasing economic integration in turn corroborated and sustained the process
of institutional integration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the index of institutional regional
integration describing, which describes the main stages of institutional co-operation among selected
sub-groups of European and Latin American countries, each taken as a whole.  Section 3 presents
some selected indicators of economic integration, including some measures of exchange rate
variability in the two regions.  Section 4 conducts a cluster analysis addressing the questions spelled
out above.  Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2.  An institutional index of regional integration for the European Union and Mercosur
We trace here the main stages of institutional integration by constructing an index of
institutional regional integration for the EU. We then apply this index also to Mercosur.
6 After
explaining our methodology (in Section 2.1, but see also Appendix 1 for greater detail), we review the
main indications that can be drawn from the progression of this index within the EU and Mercosur
over time (Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively).
2.1 Methodology
In his seminal contribution, Balassa (1961) identified five main stages of regional integration
7.
Such stages can here be defined as the outcome of policy decisions taken by regional
intergovernmental fora and/or supranational institutions in order to affect the depth and breadth of
regional integration. In this section such decisions are considered per se, i.e. without analysing their
actual impact on the degree of integration as measured by a number of economic variables. The index
is then used in Section 4 to test for the hypothesis that institutional integration interacts with economic
interdependence at regional level. Using examples drawn both from current regional arrangements in
the world and from the EU experience, the five stages can be rephrased as in Table 1.
For the purposes of this paper, the overall degree of institutional integration achieved within a
regional arrangement at a given point in time can be quantified by assigning values (“scores”) to the
level of integration recorded, for each of these five stages, throughout the relevant period (in our case,
1957-2001 for the EU and 1991-2001 for Mercosur). This allows us to measure, and therefore
compare, the EU and Mercosur in a relatively homogeneous way, although with some unavoidable
degree of discretion and judgement, which should be taken into account as a general caveat.
Table 1. The five “Balassa” stages of regional integration
                                                          
5 Fiscal dominance, insufficient trade integration and business cycle synchronisation, and weaknesses in the financial system
are usually listed as crucial deficiencies. This type of conclusion can be found in most of the literature: among others,
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Eichengreen (1998), Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2000), and Belke and Gros (2002).
6 Mercosur members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
7 An ultimate step, which goes beyond the five stages identified in the Balassa’s contribution and is not discussed in this







1. Free Trade Area
(FTA)
An area where tariffs and
quotas are abolished for imports
from area members, which,
however, retain national tariffs
and quotas against third
countries
-  In 1992 ASEAN countries launched the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) plan. On 1 January
2002 six out of ten ASEAN countries reduced
internal tariffs on most goods (so-called
“Inclusion List”) to levels ranging between zero
and five percent. The whole ASEAN area is
scheduled to become a fully-fledged free trade
area in the coming years.
-  The USA, Canada and Mexico are in the process
of completing a North-American FTA
(NAFTA): many tariffs were eliminated already
in 1994, with others being phased out over
periods of 5 to 15 years
2. Customs Union
(CU)
A FTA setting up common
tariffs and quotas (if any) for
trade with non-members
-  European Economic Community since 1968
-  The MERCOSUR aims at becoming a fully-
fledged CU by 2006
3. Common Market
(CM)
A CU abolishing non-tariff
barriers to trade (product and
services markets integration) as
well as restrictions on factor
movement (factor market
integration)
-  European Community since 1993 (establishment
of the European Single Market). The CM was
already set up as an objective under the Treaty
of Rome
-  The Andean Community aims at becoming a
common market by 2005
4. Economic Union
(EUN)
A CM with a significant degree




-  European Union nowadays
5. Total Economic
Integration (TEI)
An EUN with all relevant
economic policies conducted at
the supranational level, possibly
in compliance with the
principle of subsidiarity. To this
aim, both supranational
authorities and supranational
laws need to be in place
-  The euro area (i.e., 12 out of 15 countries of the
European Union) can be currently classified
somewhere between an EUN and a TEI.
Supranational authorities and rule making were
established already with the Treaty of Rome in
1957, and subsequently enhanced
We assign scores from 0 to 25 to the degree of regional integration achieved over time in the
development of, respectively, a Free Trade Area/Customs Union (FTA/CU, considered jointly), a
Common Market (CM), an Economic Union (EUN), and an area with Total Economic Integration
(TEI). By summing up the scores achieved in each moment in time (we use monthly data), an index of
institutional regional integration is obtained which can range between 0 (no economic integration at
all) and 100 (full economic integration, including monetary and financial integration). Scores are
assigned on the basis of the specific indicators and criteria presented in Appendix 1. Two general
criteria should be here borne in mind. First, to the extent possible scores are not assigned on the basis
of the year when a certain decision was taken (e.g. Treaty of Rome in 1957), but rather the year and
month when such a decision started being actually implemented (e.g. lowering of EU-6 internal tariffs
between 1959 and 1968). This implies that those projects which were never implemented (e.g. Werner
Plan) are not taken into account. Second, especially in the European experience some Balassa stages
tend to develop in parallel, which implies that in this case the term “stage” could be misleading. For
instance, when it became a customs union (1968), EU-6 had already one fundamental characteristic of
TEI, i.e. a number of supranational institutions and the structuring of integration through Community
law. This entails that numbers can be assigned in parallel to each of the five stages (see Appendix 1).	
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The institutional index of regional integration is constructed for:
(i)  the EU-6 founding Member States taken as a whole (see Figure 1 and, for greater detail,
Appendix 1);
(ii)  Mercosur taken as a whole (Figure 2 and Appendix 1).
The reason why we prefer using the composite index only for EU-6 instead of EU-15 is that
the path followed by individual EU Member States in joining the EU has been quite heterogeneous
over time.
8  Each of these groupings or individual countries proceeded with its own speed and path in
the process of integration with other partner countries
9. This implies that a composite index for the
EU-15, though feasible, would be more difficult to interpret than for EU-6.
The methodology used to build up the composite index for EU-6 is described in Appendix 1,
where the criteria and indicators used to assign scores to each of the Balassa stages are illustrated.
Appendix 1 also reports the specific scores given to each event in the process of regional integration
(see Table A1.1), and, what is more important, summarises the analysis in a table providing an
historical perspective (Table A1.2). This allows showing how the institutional index of regional
integration evolved in the EU-6 area between 1957 and 2001 in a more analytical way than as shown
in Figure 1. The same methodology has been used, mutatis mutandis, to construct the index for
Mercosur taken as a whole (Table A1.3).
2.2 What does the institutional index of regional integration tell us with regard to the EU?
Figure 1, and also Table A1.2 in Appendix 1, outline the evolution of the composite index of
institutional regional integration for EU-6 from 1957 to 2001. Two main features of the European
process of integration emerge.
First, the EU/euro area
10 obtains a score as high as 86 out of 100 at the end of 2001 (see Figure
1). The EU/euro area can indeed claim to have achieved, at the same time, a developed common
market, strong policy co-ordination, a single monetary and exchange rate policy, and – which can be
seen as a major requirement for the aforementioned achievements – supranational institutions and
supranational laws enforced by the courts. If one used the EU as a yardstick to measure regional
integration processes around the world, it would be expected that the other existing arrangements
obtain a much lower score (see Section 2.3 as far as Mercosur is concerned). Nevertheless, even using,
as we do, a model of integration both based on the principle of subsidiarity and not considering the
ultimate stage of Political Union, the EU does not obtain the highest score possible. Further steps in
the deepening of European regional integration can be envisaged especially in the areas of labour
mobility, harmonisation of national structural policies (e.g. in the area of labour market flexibility),
further deepening of integration in European capital markets, and co-ordination of those
macroeconomic policies which are not unified.
Second, using EU-6 as the benchmark, we can distinguish three sub-periods in the process of
regional integration (Figure 1). The first period, characterised by faster integration, proceeds from
March 1957 (Treaty of Rome) to July 1968 (completion of the customs union). By that time more than
                                                          
8 One should in fact distinguish among these country groupings or individual countries: EU-6 (i.e., BE, GE, FR, IT, LU, NL);
Ireland (IE), which joined the EU in 1973; Denmark and United Kingdom (DK, UK), which also joined the EU in 1973;
Greece (GR), which joined the EU in 1981; Spain and Portugal (ES, PT), which joined the EU in 1986; Austria and Finland
(AU, FI), which joined the EU in 1995; and Sweden (SE), which also joined the EU in 1995.
9 EU-6 countries followed a relatively homogeneous path. As regards the 9 remaining EU Member States, IE had
implemented all measures to participate in the CU already by 1977, and became a member of the euro area in 1999. DK
and UK also entered the customs union in 1977, but do not participate in EMU. DK, however, participates in the ERM II,
which is not the case of UK. GR accomplished the transition to the CU in 1986, and adopted the euro in 2001. ES and PT
became EU members in 1986, entered the CU only in 1995, and EMU in 1999. AU and FI became members of both the EU
and the CU in the same year (1995), and adopted the euro in 1999. Finally, SE differs from AU and FI as it is does not
participate in EMU, but differently from DK and UK does not have an “opting-out” clause.
10 It should be noted that, since the adoption of the euro in 1999 (2001 for Greece), all 12 euro area Member States have
reached the same level and follow the same path of institutional integration. This implies that since 1999 the groupings
“EU-6” and “euro area” are equivalent in terms of score in Figure 1.	
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half of the overall institutional integration process had been already completed. In July 1968 the EU
was indeed much more than a customs union, since it already had some genuine characteristics of
subsequent Balassa stages (see Appendix 1, Table A1.2). The second period can be identified between
the start of the 1970s and the mid-1980s, and is characterised by sluggish integration (so-called “euro-
scepticism”), with the noteworthy exception of the EMS start in March 1979. Finally, in the third,
most recent period a new, considerable acceleration in regional integration can be observed: as a
result, the EU/euro area can currently be classified somewhere between an EUN and a TEI.
If the core proposition discussed in this paper is true – i.e., the proposition that regional
institutional integration interacts with regional economic integration – one would expect that trends in
EU economic integration between 1957 and 2001 follow a path similar to that we have tracked for
institutional integration. This will be discussed in Section 4.
Figure 1
N.B.: (1) EU-6 is here taken as a whole
 (2) 1957 = 0
 (3) Highest score possible for regional integration: 100
2.3 An application of the index to Mercosur
Since the early 1990s, a process of revitalisation and renewal of Latin American sub-regional
integration
11 has accompanied the structural economic reforms being implemented in the countries of
the region. Mercosur, created in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, soon came to
prominence for the economic area being developed in the Southern Cone of South America, with a
population of over 220 million and a GDP in excess of USD 900 billion. Mercosur’s final objectives
                                                          
11 The process of regional integration in Latin America does not, in fact, start in the 1990s. Examples of regional integration
in the earlier periods are the Cartagena Agreement founding the Andean Group (1969) and the Chaguaramas Treaty
founding the Caribbean Community (1973).
































































are ambitious: to create a common market and to co-ordinate the economic policies of its member
countries. Equally striking was the single-mindedness with which Mercosur pursued its objectives in
the first half of the 1990s, which led to the satisfactory conclusion in December 1994 of what was
known as the transition phase (see Appendix 1, Table A1.3). Partly as a result of these institutional
developments (see Eichengreen (1998) for other explaining factors), the share of intra-regional trade in
aggregate Mercosur exports rose throughout the decade, from 9% in 1990 to 25% in 1998 (see Section
3 for greater detail). Despite the uncertainty in and setbacks to the process of integration caused by the
1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real and the Argentine crisis since end-2000, Mercosur remains the
core sub-regional arrangement in Latin America. It might be revitalised and deepened in the coming
years, also as a result of a new wave of initiatives in the aftermath of the Argentine crisis.
Figure 2
N.B.: (1) The four Mercosur member States and EU-6 are here taken as a whole
 (2) 1957 = 0
 (3) Highest score possible for regional integration: 100
Despite its achievements, Mercosur ranks much lower than the EU in terms of degree of
regional integration, with an index accounting for 23 out of 100 at the end of 2001 (i.e., a score
comparable to that achieved by EU-6 already in the mid-1960s). Using the EU as a yardstick, the
index of institutional regional integration for Mercosur accounts for only one quarter of the EU index
at the end of 2001 (see Figure 2 and Appendix 1, Table A1.3). This can be attributed not only to the
“quantity” of integration – i.e., the fact that Mercosur obtains high scores only as a free trade area and
a customs union – but also to its “quality”.
It is in the latter field – i.e., how the free trade area and customs union are actually
implemented – that Mercosur might consider drawing some lessons from the European experience.
First, differently from the EU, Mercosur countries not only can still keep their own tariffs for a list of
exempted goods, but are empowered to withdraw from their commitments as both the Brazilian and
Argentine experiences confirm. This reversibility is among the main reason why Mercosur still ranks
below the EU of 1968 as a FTA/CU. Second, the Mercosur treaty is intergovernmental in nature, not
supranational (see for instance Laird (1997)). As a result, Mercosur’s decisions have no force as such








































































































Institutional index of regional integration for Mercosur (1991-2001) as 
compared to EU-6 (1957-2001)	
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States to comply with common market rules. There is indeed no supranational court through which
either a member country or the Mercosur Secretariat can enforce treaty provisions on another member
or a private party. This implies that the existence of several Mercosur bodies cannot be weighed as
much as for EU bodies.
3.  Comparing economic integration in Europe and Latin America
We now turn to the issue of economic integration and how economic integration has developed
over time in both Europe and Latin America. An obvious starting point is the optimum currency area
(OCA) theory, which was first developed by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969).
 12
In essence, OCA theory analyses whether the pre-conditions exist for establishing a monetary union
with a common currency and a common monetary policy among different countries. The question of
whether countries are sufficiently integrated in order to form a monetary union is not the one we are
addressing in this paper. However, OCA theory can be a useful tool for helping us define and measure
economic integration.
3.1  Measuring economic integration
To measure economic integration, we look at variables of economic integration suggested by
the OCA theory, as well as some other variables that have not been explicitly mentioned within this
framework but which help complement a more comprehensive definition of economic integration.
Most of the employed variables are commonly used in the empirical analysis of OCA criteria. This
sub-section outlines the definition of and rationale for including them in our analysis.
Synchronisation of the business cycle
A high degree of synchronisation of the business cycle across two countries indicates that the
business cycle in each country is driven largely by common external shocks, or that the economies of
the two countries are highly interdependent (Artis and Zhang, 1998a and 1998b). The higher
synchronisation, the lower is the cost of pursuing common policies and deepening integration.
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synchronisation of the business cycle.
Convergence of inflation rates
Deepening institutional integration is most beneficial if inflation rates are already reasonably
similar among the member states participating in the regional arrangement. Inflation convergence, for
instance, is a key element of the Maastricht Treaty for the creation of a single European currency. We
measure the convergence of inflation as the difference of the 12-month percentage changes in the
consumer price indices, and alternatively as the correlation coefficient, for each country with the
region’s average.
Exchange rate variability
Some authors see a low level of exchange rate variability as a corollary of the OCA property
on convergence/similarity of inflation rates. The terms of trade should indeed exhibit narrow
fluctuations between countries pursuing intra-regional exchange rate stability or even planning to
share a single currency (see for example Eichengreen 1990). If real exchange rate variability is low
and currencies are stable vis-à-vis each other, the cost of abandoning exchange rate flexibility or even
adopting a common currency is lower. For the European country groupings we take, as our measure of
intra-regional exchange rate variability, the “region” average of each country’s moving average
                                                          
12 For a recent survey of the OCA theory see Tavlas (1993), DeGrauwe (2000), McKinnon (2001), Mongelli (2002).	
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variance of the log difference of the real/nominal bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the de facto anchor
currency, the Deutsche Mark. For Latin America, being not able to identify an anchor country, we take
the same measure using each country’s average bilateral exchange rates variability vis-à-vis all other
regional currencies.
Trade openness and integration
OCA theory implies that different countries can benefit more from reducing or even
eliminating exchange rate variability if they already trade strongly with each other. We employ two
types of measures on the trade side. First, we measure the degree of regional trade integration as the
ratio of intra-regional trade to total trade. The potential drawback of this measure is that this ratio may
not increase even if intra-regional trade rises strongly because of an even higher growth rate in extra-
regional trade. We therefore use as an alternative measure the ratio of intra-regional trade to GDP as
an indicator of trade openness.
Financial market integration
One important area that has not been sufficiently discussed in the OCA literature is the degree
of financial market integration. Countries may benefit from financial market integration by allocating
resources more efficiently and reducing transaction costs. Financial market integration permits also to
cushion temporary adverse disturbances through capital inflows – e.g. by borrowing from surplus
areas or de-cumulating net foreign assets that can be reverted when the shock is over. Under a high
degree of financial integration even modest changes in interest rates would elicit equilibrating capital
movements across partner countries.  This would reduce differences in interest rates, easing the
financing of external imbalances. In this paper we employ two proxies for financial market integration.
The first is the correlation of monthly equity market returns across countries. We also investigate the
degree of financial market openness, which is defined as the ratio of equity market capitalisation to
GDP for each country.
Convergence of interest rates
The convergence of interest rates is used as a measure of financial market integration but also
of the degree of similarity of the monetary policy stance across countries. The rationale for using this
measure is that the higher the initial similarity of interest rates, the less is the cost for each country by
moving to a common monetary policy. We test in the analysis both the correlation of nominal short-
term interest rates and of short-term real interest rates, using CPI inflation rates as deflator.
Income convergence
More economic integration should also enhance the convergence of income across countries
and regions. Again, we refer to an argument of resource allocation in this regard: more integration and
openness should lead to more mobility of factors of production, which may result in convergence of
income levels. As a proxy, we use the real GDP per capita percentage difference to the region’s
average. The real GDP per capita numbers were obtained from the Summers and Heston (1988)
database and interpolated for the past few years.
3.2 The development of economic integration in Europe and Latin America over time
3.2.1 Overview
As a starting point, it is necessary to specify the country groupings and time periods we are
focusing on. As for the index of institutional regional integration, we look at EU-6 and Mercosur
countries. In addition, for Europe we also look at the euro area, and for Latin America at a large subset
of countries which we call “Latin America 11”
13. For Europe, we consider the period 1957-2001 and
the following six sub-periods:
                                                          
13 For the purposes of this paper, Latin America 11 includes Mercosur countries, the members of the Andean Community




March 1957 – August 1971 Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
September 1971 – February
1979
Very volatile exchange rates; failed attempt to establish an exchange rate
mechanism (the “Snake”); major recession in 1973-75
March 1979 – August 1987 “Soft ERM”: introduction of EMS with frequent realignments, especially
until 1983
September 1987 – December
1992
“Hard ERM”: no realignments (apart from a realignment associated to the
lira entering the narrow ERM bad in January 1990) until the EMS crisis in
September 1992; integration of factor markets, culminating in the
establishment of the European Single Market on 1 January 1993
January 1993 – December
1998
“Pre-EMU”: Enhanced nominal convergence and run-up to monetary union
January 1999 onwards European Monetary Union (EMU)
Due to data availability, we can instead look only at a shorter time period (1980-2000) for
Latin America. We chose the following three sub-periods for the purpose of analysing the time
changes of economic integration:
Sub-period Main characteristics
January 1980 – December 1986 Latin American debt crisis; relatively moderate nominal volatility
January 1987 – December 1993 Highly volatile exchange rates, and high rates of inflation or hyperinflation
for several Latin American countries
January 1994 – December 2000 Re-structuring  and  stabilisation  programmes  in  several  economies;
strengthening of the process of regional integration
Table 2 shows the list of the eleven above-described indicators of economic integration for the
six sub-periods for Europe and the three sub-periods for Latin America. Figure 3 provides more
detailed examples of the time dynamics of integration. This figure compares the EU-6 countries with
Mercosur countries, and show 5-year moving averages for some of the selected indicators of regional
economic integration.
As expected, both EU-6 and the euro area are generally a much more integrated economic area
than Latin America over time (not only than the selected 11 Latin American countries, but also than
Mercosur countries). Overall, comparing the levels of economic integration emerging from the above
tables and figures, one can conclude that the degree of economic integration in Latin America is
roughly close to that in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.
As Table 2 illustrates, exchange rate variability in Latin America has been substantially
higher than in Europe (even with respect to the 1970s, a period characterised by high exchange rate
variability in Europe as well). Since changes in the exchange rate arrangement have been of key
importance for understanding the integration process in Europe, in the next sub-section 3.2.2 we
provide a more detailed discussion on the development of exchange rates. Regional trade integration
and openness are in Europe much larger than in Latin America on average. The interest rates and
inflation rates show a much higher degree of co-movement in Europe than in Latin America. In
particular, the correlation of nominal interest rates has been around 60% within the euro area during
the pre-EMU period, but only around 30% for the Latin American countries. Finally, the higher degree
of economic integration is also reflected in the integration of financial markets. Equity market return
correlations in Europe are at around 50% or higher, which is around twice as high as the correlation in
Latin America.
As Figure 3 shows, business cycle correlation, inflation convergence, real interest rate
correlation and financial market integration have all been persistently higher within the EU-6 area than
among the Mercosur countries, despite some degree of variability in the variables. Similarly, EU-6






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2.2 Further evidence on exchange rate variability
Changes in the exchange rate arrangement have been very important for
understanding the institutional integration process in Europe. The measure of nominal and
real exchange variability briefly outlined in section 3.1 and Table 2 provide a useful insight in
this respect. In this sub-section we provide a more detailed discussion of the development of
exchange rates dynamics using a more elaborated indicator of exchange rate variability,
which has been extensively used in the literature
14.
Bilateral exchange rate variability between currency i and j (σ 
ij) is defined here as
the moving sample standard deviation of the growth rate of the bilateral exchange rate (first





















where e is the monthly change in nominal/real bilateral exchange rate while n is the order of
the moving standard deviation. In the computation n has been set at 4 in order not to
excessively smooth the monthly exchange rate variability. In order to have an indicator of the
exchange rate variability within EU or Latin American country groupings, we construct a
weighted average (using trade weights) of the above measures using each bilateral variability.
For example, in the case of the euro area country grouping, the real (or nominal) exchange
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Table 3 and Figure 4.a present the indicators of nominal and real exchange rate
variability for the euro area.
16 A visual inspection of Figure 4.a reveals that between 1957
and 1998 real exchange rate variability has always exceeded nominal exchange rate
variability. This is indicative of the fact that in the EU an effort to pursue nominal
convergence (i.e., one major requirement for successful regional integration) was in place.
Although with different levels of commitment and different paths over time, EU Member
States with higher inflation rates accepted swings in, and an appreciation of, their real
                                                          
14 See Kenen and Rodrik (1986), Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Chowdhury (1993) and Arize (1996 and 1999).
15 In the euro area example there are 12 countries but i and j goes from 1 to 11 because Belgium and Luxembourg
represent just one country, so there are 55 bilateral real exchange rates and trade weights.
16  Note that Table 3 also includes the EU-6 and EU-15 while Figure 4 only presents the exchange rate variability
for the euro area.	
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effective exchange rate. This served as an instrument to pursue disinflation and re-structure
domestic industry exposed to international competition. Sometimes this led to unsustainable
trends in the real exchange rates, which in the ERM experience were then adjusted – though
usually only partially and ex-post – by means of so-called “realignments” of the nominal
exchange rates.
Besides this general indication, we can distinguish a few sub-periods. A striking
feature of fixed but adjustable exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system is that it did
not shield European countries from some “occasional” adjustments in exchange rate parities
and from some significant real exchange rate variability. The subsequent sub-period,
following the demise of Bretton Woods and prior to the ERM experience, is characterised by
the highest overall nominal and real exchange rate variability. During the subsequent two sub-
periods – i.e. the “soft-and the hard-ERM” – variability declined albeit unevenly and with a
very sizeable swing back in the run-up to the 1992-ERM crisis and its aftermath.  Nominal
exchange rate variability then disappeared with the introduction of the euro in January 1999,
while real exchange rate variability has thus far declined to its lowest levels ever.
Table 4 focuses on real exchange rate variability in Latin America, distinguishing
between Mercosur, Mercosur and its associate members (Chile and Bolivia), and Latin
America 11 (the latter is also represented in Figure 4.b). The Table illustrates that in the
period 1980-2001 real exchange rate variability in Mercosur was almost 7 times higher than
in EU-6, while nominal exchange rate variability was nearly 10 times higher. During times of
crisis such variability rose to much higher levels, but such episodes are not discussed in this
paper. The more recent episode of exchange rate instability in the region is also excluded
from our sample.  An important difference with respect to Europe is that in Latin America
nominal exchange rate variability generally exceeds real exchange rate variability. This is
indicative of the fact that in Latin America there was no systematic effort to pursue nominal
convergence over time.

































































Table 4 also shows that exchange rate variability in Mercosur displays some very
marked changes between sub-periods. In particular there are two “tranquil periods” – such as
from April 1983 to December 1988, and from February 1992 to October 1998 - during which
variability was remarkably lower than in the other “crises periods.” In particular, the levels of
both nominal and real exchange rate variability during the second “tranquil period” – i.e., the




The latter observation indicates that high exchange rate variability is not necessarily
embedded in the Latin American economic and financial system. There were in fact two
periods in which successful stabilisation was achieved and maintained for some time.
However, a climate of sustained low exchange rate variability also requires supporting














































































































































































































































































4. Comparing institutional and economic integration: a cluster analysis
We can now turn to the main question of this paper: testing the hypothesis that
institutional integration interacts with economic interdependence at the regional levels. We
examine and compare the degree and dynamics of integration in both Europe and in Latin
America.
After explaining the methodology in Section 4.1, we address three types of questions.
A first question is: how really integrated are the countries within Europe and Latin America
from an economic viewpoint? Can one identify homogenous groups of countries within
regions? And, if so, what makes countries within groups similar? Second, by looking at a
relatively long time horizon (from 1957 onwards for Europe and from 1980 onwards for Latin
America) we investigate the dynamics of the process of economic integration within both
regions. Which periods have experienced a particularly strong increase in economic
integration? While these questions are addressed in Section 4.2, in Section 4.3 we analyse the
link between institutional integration, as described in Section 2 above, and economic
integration in Europe in comparison with Latin America.
4.1  Methodology
The purpose of the cluster analysis is to detect natural groupings, or “clusters”,
among countries. The way the cluster analysis is detecting such groupings is by measuring the
dissimilarity among the countries and assigning each country to a particular group by using a
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where D(i,j) measures the dissimilarity between country i and country j for all economic
integration characteristics k.
There are two different methods of forming the clusters or groupings. First, one can
partition the countries into a predetermined number of clusters. This implies that each country
is assigned by iteration to that group to which it is most similar. The second alternative is the
hierarchical clustering method.
17 We use this second alternative, more precisely an
“agglomerative” hierarchical clustering method. In essence, this method starts by creating a
number of clusters N that is equal to the number of countries in the sample. The method
proceeds by first combining those two countries that are most similar, and then continuing in
the same fashion till all countries belong to the same group or to a single group out of a pre-
specified number of groups. We use the average of each group when comparing the Euclidean
distance of two different groups. This ensures that the shape of the clusters is reasonably
compact.
A further relevant issue is the normalisation of the data. As a starting point, we wish
to give equal weight to each of the economic integration variables k. Under the assumption
that the variables are each distributed normally, we need to transform the data to have the
same mean and standard deviation. We chose a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
unity.
                                                          
17  See Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) and Gordon (1999) for a detailed analysis of cluster analysis
methodology and the different underlying choices a modeller has to take.	
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4.2  The degree and dynamics of regional economic integration
4.2.1 Results for the EU
Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2 shows the cluster analysis dendrograms for the fifteen EU
countries and the six sub-periods specified in Section 3.2.1. The dendrograms show in which
order and at what degree of dissimilarity countries have merged together.
The dendrograms allows us to identify a trend since the 1950s. First, the degree of
economic heterogeneity was generally much higher in Europe between the 1950s and 1970s.
This can be seen from the size of the Euclidean distance on the vertical axis. It is also less
clear-cut to identify clusters in the earlier periods than in the later periods.
A second interesting result is that the countries forming clusters have changed over
time, in some cases drastically. More specifically, between the 1950s and the end of the 1970s
integration seems to have been strongly related to the geographic location and distance of the
countries to each other. This point is clearly illustrated for the period 1971-79. In this period,
the country pairs that were most integrated with each other were usually direct geographic
neighbours: Austria, Germany and Denmark; Belgium and the Netherlands; Spain and
Portugal; and Greece and Italy. By contrast, since the 1980s clusters correspond more closely
to institutional arrangements, in particular the participation in the ERM and EMU, than to
geographic location.
This suggests that EU countries have become increasingly homogenous over time,
while the forming of clusters has gradually more been based on institutional factors than on
geographic factors.
Figure 5.  Real Integration versus Nominal Integration in Europe, 1957-2000
N.B.:  The lower the values on the axes, the higher integration.
           Core EMU refers to EU-6 founding Member States. Other EMU-6 comprises the other euro
area Member States. Non-EMU countries are Denmark, Sweden and UK.
To investigate these general findings in greater detail, Table 5 shows the degree of
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1 971 -78
19 9 8 - 0 0
1 993-98 1 987-92
1 979-86
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dissimilarity, based on the normalised Euclidean distance, for each group of countries with
the EU average. A smaller number implies a lower degree of dissimilarity and, therefore, a
higher degree of integration.
Table 5.  Measuring Economic Integration in Europe
First, core EMU countries (core EMU6 cluster) have always been the most integrated
and also further deepened their integration over time. By contrast, the non-EMU cluster has
not managed to intensify its degree of integration over time. The most interesting case may be
the “other” EMU6 cluster of countries that joined the integration process somewhat later. This
cluster includes geographically diverse countries that had the lowest degree of integration in
the 1950s and 1960s. However, since the 1970s these countries showed the fastest rate of
integration.
A second important finding is that the degree of nominal economic integration has
been significantly faster than real integration in Europe over the past 50 years  (see Table 5







1957 - 70 4.85 3.65 6.12 5.68
1971 - 78 5.12 3.85 6.45 6.00
1979 - 87 5.15 3.90 6.00 6.64
1988 - 92 4.67 3.23 5.49 6.26
1993 - 98 4.34 2.56 4.91 6.48
1999 - 2001 4.02 2.64 4.04 6.40
Real economic integration
5
1957 - 70 3.08 2.25 3.63 4.00
1971 - 78 2.95 2.48 3.43 3.56
1979 - 87 2.74 1.78 3.46 3.47
1988 - 92 2.88 2.00 3.51 3.69
1993 - 98 3.02 1.83 3.71 4.09
1999 - 2001 2.80 1.86 3.11 4.05
Nominal economic integration
6
1957 - 70 3.84 3.05 5.07 4.04
1971 - 78 4.23 2.95 5.60 4.85
1979 - 87 4.32 3.35 4.95 5.58
1988 - 92 3.63 2.33 4.35 4.93
1993 - 98 3.33 1.93 3.71 5.10
1999 - 2001 2.62 1.38 2.57 4.59
Notes:
As explained in the text, integration is measured as  the average of the normalised Euclidean distance of the
variables. Therefore, a smaller number indicates less dissimialrity and hence higher integration.
1   Core EMU6 are: Belgium/Luxemburg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
2   Other EMU6 are: Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
3   Non-EMU cluster are: Denmark, Sweden, UK
4   includes 7 variables: business cycle convergence, inflation difference, real interest rate convergence,
    real exchange rate volatility, trade integration, financial market integration, real per capita GDP convergence
5   includes 3 variables: business cycle convergence, trade integration, real per capita GDP convergence
6   includes 4 variables: inflation difference, real interest rate convergence, real exchange rate volatility,
    financial market integration	
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and Figure 5). EMU countries were initially more similar with regard to real economic
variables than to their nominal counterparts. Real integration progressed and reached a high
level by the late 1970s and since then the deepening has slowed. By contrast, nominal
volatilities increased and nominal integration fell during the 1970s with the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods System. However, the economic integration process in Europe in the 1980s
and 1990s has then mainly been driven by stronger integration among inflation rates, interest
rates, exchange rates and financial markets.
These findings strongly point at institutional factors as the driving force of European
economic integration: countries at the centre of the institutional integration process have also
been those that have integrated most strongly economically.
4.2.2  Results for Latin America
Looking at the dendrograms of the cluster analysis (Figure A.2.2 in Appendix 2)
reveals that economic integration in Latin America takes still place along geographic lines.
The countries most integrated with each other are (i) Argentina, Uruguay and Chile; (ii)
Brazil, Paraguay and Peru; (iii) Colombia and Venezuela.
Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador are among the least economically integrated countries
in Latin America. This is likely to be partly explained by the specific economic characteristics
of some of these countries, and also partly by their geographic location. Mexico stands out in
particular. It is intuitively convincing that Mexico is one of the least integrated as it is more
integrated with the US economy than with the rest of Latin America.
 Figure 6. Real Integration versus Nominal Integration in Latin America, 1980-2000
N.B.:  The lower the values on the axes, the higher integration.
Turning to the Euclidean measure of integration gives an interesting picture about the
time dynamics of the economic integration process in Latin America. Table 6 shows the
measure of integration for all Latin America 11 countries as well as for the six countries of
Mercosur plus associates. The most interesting information we obtain from this table is that
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economic variables, such as less nominal and real exchange rate variability, more inflation
and interest rate convergence and a higher degree of financial market integration. Real
integration through the intensification of business cycle co-movements and trade has been
markedly slower. This point is also illustrated in Figure 6, which graphs the nominal
integration measure against the real one.
Moreover, economic integration among the four Mercosur countries plus two
associate countries has reached a higher level than in Latin America as a whole. The period
1987-93 also deserves a special mention in this context. Table 6 shows that the integration
process came to a temporary halt during this period as none of the integration measures
deepened throughout these seven years. This most likely is explained by the difficult
economic conditions present during that time as numerous Latin American countries suffered
under high inflation rates, slow growth and substantial exchange rate variability.
 Table 6.  Measuring Economic Integration in Latin America
On the whole, the findings of the cluster analysis show that both Latin America and
Europe have become more integrated over time. In particular, the integration process of real
variables (business cycle, trade and income) is generally much slower than the integration
process of nominal variables (exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and financial markets).
This is a result that one would expect, given the fact that the real integration process of
economies is generally much slower as it partly requires the mobility and built-up of physical







1980 - 86 2.44 2.13
1987 - 93 2.29 2.11
1994 - 2000 1.87 1.64
Real economic integration
4
1980 - 86 1.19 0.98
1987 - 93 1.21 1.10
1994 - 2000 1.12 0.95
Nominal economic integration
5
1980 - 86 1.86 1.63
1987 - 93 1.86 1.66
1994 - 2000 1.28 0.98
Notes:
As explained in the text, integration is measured as the average of the normalised Euclidean distance of the
variables. Therefore, a smaller number indicates less dissimialrity and hence higher integration.
1   Latin America 11 are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
          Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2   Mercosur are: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
3   includes 6 variables: business cycle convergence, inflation convergence real interest rate convergence,
    real exchange rate volatility, trade integration, financial market integration
4   includes 2 variables: business cycle convergence, trade integration
5   includes 4 variables: inflation difference, real interest rate convergence, real exchange rate volatility,
    financial market integration	
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convergence of inflation rates and interest rates across countries than to achieve a closer co-
movement of business cycles and trade.
4.3 Interaction between institutional and economic integration: some lessons for Latin
America from the European experience
A compelling finding of the analysis conducted in the previous section is that
economic integration in Europe occurred along geographic lines in the earlier periods,
whereas it took place mainly along institutional lines since the 1980s. Countries that were
most closely committed to European institutional co-operation also integrated more quickly
than those joining the various stages of the institutional process (e.g. ERM and monetary
union) only later or not at all.
This suggests that institutional integration indeed had an important impact on
economic integration in Europe. This is confirmed by Figure 7, which uses the institutional
index of regional integration constructed in Section 3 for EU-6 countries and shows that
economic integration was slower or even halted during periods, such as the 1970s, when
progress in institutional integration was slow. By contrast, economic integration was faster
when institutional integration deepened significantly, for instance in the late 1980s and 1990s.
For the Mercosur countries (Figure 8), the degree of institutional integration is still much
lower than in Europe, although some progress was made in the 1990s.
One of the key lessons from the European experience for Latin America is therefore
that intensifying institutional integration, such as for instance through the creation of a
common market and the co-operation of monetary and exchange rate policies, indeed plays an
important role in deepening and accelerating the process of regional economic integration.
The importance of deepening institutional integration for economic integration in Europe can
therefore be taken as a valuable example for the future path of integration in Latin America.
Figure 7
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Institutional Integration versus Economic Integration in Mercosur countries, 1980-2000
N.B.:  The lower the values in Figures 7 and 8, the higher the degree of economic integration.
5. Concluding remarks
A distinctive feature of European regional integration has been a systematic and
incremental approach to institutional integration. This is clearly measured by the new
indicator developed in this paper. An ever-larger group of European countries have
progressed along the five Balassa stages of regional integration. This has entailed, among
other things, a transfer of sovereignty and responsibilities in an increasing number of areas.
As our indicator of institutional integration shows for EU-6 countries, the cases of reversal in
the process of institutional integration were just a few, and limited to relatively short periods.
In comparison, institutional integration has thus far been modest in Latin America.
Europe and Latin America have also performed very differently in terms of some
selected, and illustrative, indicators of economic integration. Historically, even excluding
from our sample period the most recent episode of exchange rate instability, real (nominal)
exchange rate variability has been 7 (10) times higher in Mercosur than in EU-6 countries.
The current level of economic integration, as measured by a large number of OCA-based
indicators, is in Latin America by and large comparable to that of European countries in the
1960-1970s.
While we have not explicitly tested for the direction of causality between institutional
and economic integration, we have found a strong correlation between them: following each
institutional stage economic integration deepened, enhancing welfare and efficiency for the
participating countries and justifying the subsequent institutional stage. The cluster analysis
used in this paper also shows that, between the 1950s and 1970s, economic integration in
Europe primarily occurred among geographically close countries. However, since the early
1980s the economic integration process occurred mainly along institutional lines. In other















































Europe also integrated more strongly with each other, whereas countries less involved in the
institutional process also integrated less in economic terms. Finally, the cluster analysis finds
that the monetary integration process in Europe, culminating in EMU at the beginning of
1999, has been the main driving force of European economic integration since the 1980s.
One key lesson from the European experience for Latin America is, therefore, that
intensifying institutional integration, for instance through the creation of a common market
and the co-ordination of monetary and exchange rate policies, might indeed play an important
role in deepening and accelerating the process of regional economic integration. The
importance of deepening institutional integration for economic integration in Europe can be
taken as a valuable example for the future path of integration in Latin America. However, it
should be emphasised that the process of regional integration, and in particular of monetary
unification, is a lengthy and complex one. Its successful implementation takes time and
requires a strong, sustained political commitment. Another important lesson for Latin
America is that, while the deepening of economic integration calls for an effective
institutional framework, further advancements in institutional integration are in turn feasible
only if economic integration supports them as well.
To what extent, however, can Latin America follow the footprint of Europe? After
all, Latin America currently fulfils the OCA criteria that we have reviewed to a lesser extent
not only than the EU today, but sometimes even than the EU at the beginning of its regional
integration process. As a group, Latin American countries display a lack of persistent fiscal
discipline, low trade and financial integration, and modest business cycle synchronisation. Is
this necessarily problematic? A possible, although partial, reply to this question can be found
in the hypothesis of “endogeneity” of OCA, which has been discussed quite extensively in the
economic literature in recent years.
18 The basic intuition behind the endogeneity hypothesis is
that monetary integration reduces trading costs much beyond the elimination of the costs
arising from exchange rate variability (that can be to some extent hedged). A common
currency among partner countries is seen as “a much more serious and durable commitment”
(McCallum (1995)).
19 The ultimate implications of this hypothesis is that a group of countries
adopting a single currency might develop into an OCA ex-post even if this group does not
constitute an OCA ex-ante (Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (1997, 2000)). Hence, the
OCA characteristics of a regional arrangement are not given once and for all.
This justifies in turn a number of questions that would need to be fully addressed in a
future extension of this paper. Would the present modest level of economic integration
necessarily rule out the option of further deepening regional integration in Latin America? Or
would it rather suggest that the process(es) of (sub)regional integration will succeed in Latin
America to the extent that realistic objectives are set in line with regional economic
conditions and the prevailing level of political commitment? After all, the experience of the
EU seems more in line with this second line of reasoning, and the European process of
integration has always had strong political roots, motivations and purposes. The political
commitment has permitted the process to move forward through increasingly advanced
institutional stages.
Over time the EU has, in fact, experienced a dynamic interaction between the process
of institutional integration and the fulfilment of certain OCA criteria. While this result is
                                                          
18  For some qualifications, and explanations, of the “endogeneity” of OCA studies see Quah (2000), van Wincoop
(2000), De Grauwe (2000), Gaspar and Mongelli (2002), and Mongelli (2002).
19  Amongst others, sharing a single currency precludes future competitive devaluation, fosters trade and financial
integration, facilitates foreign direct investment and the building of long-term relationships, and might over
time encourage forms of political integration.  This will in turn promote economic and financial integration
and even business cycle synchronisation among the countries sharing the single currency.  This could result
from the increasing propensity of partner countries to import from each other, from productivity shocks
spilling over via trade, or the disciplining effect of a monetary or exchange rate arrangement.	
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consistent with the hypothesis of OCA endogeneity, it does not mean that OCA criteria are
entirely endogenous to the policy decisions affecting regional integration. There is indeed no
“automatic pilot” ensuring that a strengthening in institutional integration will bring about, for
instance, higher intra-regional trade, more synchronised business cycles, financial market
integration and nominal convergence. Rather it means that, if the analysis becomes dynamic
and forward-looking, a virtuous circle may be identified between institutional and economic
integration at the regional level.
The analysis in this paper and, in general, tests of the hypothesis that institutional
integration interacts with economic integration at the regional level, will need to be extended
in a number of ways. Amongst others, the variables taken into consideration will need to be
broadened and additional tests of the interaction between institutional and economic
integration are required to corroborate our preliminary findings. An aspect that will require
due consideration is that in Europe a strong nominal anchor presented itself “attracting” over
time other surrounding partner countries, fostering better standards for policy making (see
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CRITERIA AND INDICATORS USED TO CONSTRUCT THE INSTITUTIONAL INDEX OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION FOR EU-6
Indicators used for a Free Trade Area (FTA) and a Customs Union (CU)
a)  Changes over time of tariffs and quotas on trade within the area (FTA) and vis-à-vis third countries (CU)
(see also Table A1.2, column 1) - This is by far the most important indicator for a FTA/CU, which also
presents the advantage of being easily measurable and unbiased. The specific scores given are presented in
Table A1.1 at the end of this appendix.
b)  In the EU-6 case the start of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1962 is also considered (Table
A1.2, column 1) - The CAP is here taken into account only as a precondition without which it would not have
been possible to extend the FTA to agricultural goods. For this reason, the start of the CAP in 1962 implies
one additional point. The implications of CAP as an EU common policy are instead considered when
analysing the steps towards TEU.
Using these indicators, a fully-fledged CU (i.e., incorporating a FTA) would obtain a score of 25 (which is the
case for EU-6), while the intermediate stages may obtain from 1 to 13 points (see Table A1.1). The final step
toward a FTA/CU therefore obtains a much higher weight than each intermediate step. The same “non-linear”
approach applies also to the other Balassa stages described hereafter.
Indicators used for Common Market (CM)
a)  Progress in abolishing non-tariff barriers (Table A1.2, column 2) - The creation of a CU does not
automatically imply full integration of product and services markets within a region. A further step is needed
to this aim, namely the abolition of all measures with an effect comparable to that of tariffs and quotas. In
Europe, in 1974 the European Court of Justice defined such measures as “all trading rules enacted by
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade” (“Dassonville” case 8/74). Since in the subsequent years some progress was made as a
result of repeated rulings of the Court of Justice, one point is assigned in concomitance with year 1974.
Another point is assigned in 1979, when the Court issued a particularly important ruling (Cassis de Dijon).
However, there is no doubt that in Europe the key step towards the abolition of non-tariff barriers was the
1985 White Paper, a programme which by the end of 1992 had been 95% completed. The White Paper was
put into affect with the European Single Act of 1986, which entered in force in 1987 (two additional points).
As it would be extremely difficult (and possibly arbitrary) to quantify the intermediate steps between 1987
and the official launch of the European Single Market on 1 January 1993, the methodology assigns 5 points
just on the occasion of the latter event (see Table A1.1).
b)  Measures taken in order to liberalise the movement of capital (see Table A1.2, column 3)
1 - In this regard,
it could be observed that the role which measures on capital movement play in a process of regional
integration is twofold. On the one hand, restrictions on capital movements may be interpreted as a key
precondition to preserve some degree of intra-regional exchange rate stability coupled with some degree of
monetary policy autonomy. On the other hand, the liberalisation of capital movements leads to a monetary
union if member countries want to preserve intra-regional exchange rate stability. Although this “impossible
trinity” approach is correct, taken alone it does not sufficiently emphasise another key proposition, namely
                                                          
1 Technology is here not considered as a separate factor. This is based on the assumption that capital movements include FDI,
which is a major instrument of technology transfer. Opening a branch, setting up joint ventures, and acquiring foreign
companies in order to horizontally or vertically extend the production structure, is a significant component of capital
movement. However, certain empirical studies suggest that FDI fail to transfer technology. Technology improvements
often remain confined to the headquarters. This would imply that technology should be measured as a separate factor.
Hence, although this is not the case for the time being, more refined versions of this paper could include technology as a
separate item, using indicators such as the EU patents policy.	
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that the decisive and ultimate precondition for intra-regional exchange rate stability is intra-regional
economic convergence. This means that capital flow restrictions can well play a role to preserve exchange
rate stability for some time, but in the longer run they jeopardise such stability since they allow policy
makers postponing measures designed to convergence towards best performing countries. On the contrary, as
the European experience of the early 1990s clearly illustrates, free capital movement is a key factor
explaining the increasing weight of economic convergence as core goal of economic policy. Consequently, in
Table A1.1 all steps towards the liberalisation of capital movements obtain a positive score, whereas all
restrictive measures receive a negative one. Emphasis is given to those measures which were taken at the
regional level, since liberalisation in one individual country does not per se imply increased integration.
c)  Measures taken to liberalise the movement of workers (Table A1.2, column 4) - This is another key
indicator, in line with Mundell’s seminal paper (Mundell (1961)). However, achieving a single labour market
is far more demanding than integrating product, services and financial capital markets.
In the Treaty of Rome, this objective was pursued by entitling workers to accept job offers within the internal
market and by abolishing any discrimination based on nationality between workers (Art. 48). By 1968 this
rule was, at least in principle, already enforced (one point). However, this approach to labour mobility was
clearly insufficient, as it did not address the key issue of the actual possibility (i.e., disincentives) to move
across the borders of countries participating in the regional arrangement. Such an issue would involve that a
number of supplementary measures be taken at the regional level, such as promoting the mobility of pension
rights, making information on cross-border job opportunities transparent, recognising professional
qualifications across different countries, and harmonising national labour market regulations. Although since
1993 the EU is supposed to have an internal market for labour, these measures are far from having been fully
implemented. Also for that reason
2, less than 2% of the working age population of the EU consists of people
from one Member State working in another. This explains why the maximum score possible for this indicator
(8) cannot be given to EU countries in this field. Three further steps have been however selected, each
implying an additional point: a directive of 1989 on mutual recognition of higher education diplomas; the fact
that, following the Amsterdam meeting of the European Council in 1997 and the Action Plan elaborated by
the Commission the same year, policies in the area of labour mobility have gained momentum; and the full
implementation in the EU-6 area, since 1998, of the Schengen convention of 1990 on free circulation of
people.
On the whole, a CM as such (i.e, without considering the other stages of regional integration) would obtain 25
points (Table A1.1). The score assigned to EU-6 is 21, in order to signal that much has still to be done in the area
of labour mobility.
Indicators used for an Economic Union (EUN)
a)  The degree of co-ordination of national macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscal, exchange rate and monetary
policies) (see Table A1.2, column 5) - How to incorporate regional macroeconomic policies in the index of
regional integration is a complex issue, open to discussion. Such policies, in fact, cannot be considered as
independent of the need for regional exchange rate stability, but they are largely endogenous. For instance,
the establishment of the EMS in 1979 is clearly intertwined with the need for exchange rate stability in the
region, so that it is impossible to find a direction of causality between regional integration and need for
exchange rate stability (as it might still be the case, for instance, for the establishment of the CU or the CM).
Two avenues can be followed to tackle this problem.
The first avenue is that followed in this paper. According to this approach, the degree of co-ordination of all
regional macroeconomic policies should become an integral part of the index (see Table A1.2, column 5).
The rationale for this approach is that not only in the case of macroeconomic policies, but also more
generally it is impossible to disentangle the sense of causality between a process of regional integration and
the need for exchange rate stability as illustrated by the OCA variables. As already mentioned in the
Introduction, the main objective of the analysis is not that of identifying a direction of causality, but, more
simply, that of identifying a possible strong correlation between the variables.
                                                          
2 There are of course factors explaining scarce labour mobility which is very difficult – if not even impossible – for policy
makers to deal with (e.g. differences in language, life style, housing markets).	
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Along with an alternative avenue, macroeconomic policies should not be taken into account, in order to
circumscribe the problem of circular causation. This avenue is not followed in this paper.
b)  The implementation, at the regional level alongside the national level, of those microeconomic policies
which are most likely to affect the need for regional exchange rate stability (Table A1.2, column 6) -
The latter policies are mainly: (b.1) competition policy (i.e., measures designed to forbid subsidies and
regulations that favour domestic producers); (b.2) transport policy; (b.3) harmonisation of VAT on trade of
goods and services; and b.4) harmonisation of other national structural (in particular, labour market)
policies in order to increase price (in particular, labour cost) flexibility within the region. The successful
implementation of these four policies 
(see Table A1.1 for the events considered and scores assigned to each
event) is likely to increase the cross-border price elasticity of demand for similar products produced in
different countries participating in the regional arrangement. The higher the elasticity, the more a swing in
the exchange rate can heavily shift competitive advantages within the area, thus producing strong effects on
profitability and triggering political reactions. Conversely, the link between the need for regional exchange
rate stability and other microeconomic policies (e.g. R&D policy and environmental policy) seems uncertain
and in any case more indirect. The latter policies are therefore not taken into account.
On the whole, an EUN as such (i.e, without considering the other stages of regional integration) would obtain 25
points. The score assigned to EU-6 is 23, in order to signal that there is still room for improvement in the area of
harmonisation of structural policies.
Indicators used for Total Economic Integration (TEI)
a)  The set-up of supranational institutions and decision-making processes, as well as the structuring of the
process of regional integration through laws issued and enforced at the supranational level (Table
A1.2, column 7) - Of course, the use of this indicator only with regard to TEI is somewhat arbitrary.
Supranational institutions and laws can indeed play a crucial role also when building up, for instance, a FTA
or a CM. It is equally true, however, that, when pursuing total economic integration, supranational
institutions and laws become not only a desirable but also a necessary condition.
In the EU-6 experience, supranational institutions and laws were set up from the very onset of the process.
Although they were strengthened over time, there is little doubt that the basic supranational framework was
already available with the Treaty of Rome. This implies the assignment of 4 points already in 1958, when the
Treaty of Rome went into force. Out of several subsequent developments, three events have been selected,
each implying one additional point: (i) the establishment in 1974 of the European Council as a permanent
forum providing political impulse; (ii) the involvement of citizens in the election of the European Parliament
in 1979; and (iii) the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999 and introduced, among other
things, an extension of qualified majority voting. As a result, the score assigned at the end of the period
considered is 7. The highest possible score is, however, 9, in order to signal that  – apart from any discussion
on political union, which falls outside the scope of the paper – even in the EU there is a clear case for
strengthening the institutional supranational aspects of the process of regional economic integration.
b)  The concrete steps towards, and the conduction of, macroeconomic policies at the supranational level (see
Table A1.2, column 5) - We are of course referring to the achievement of a single monetary and exchange
rate policy in 1999, with the establishment of the Eurosystem and the European Central Bank (five
additional points). This event was prepared in the course of the 1990s with a process sanctioned by the
Maastricht Treaty. The most important step in this process was the so-called Stage II, which started in 1994
(one point). The score assigned at the end of the period considered is, therefore, 6. The highest possible
score is, however, 9, in order to signal that fiscal policies are already conducted at the national level,
although within the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.
c)  Those microeconomic policies which are conducted only or mostly at a supranational level and are most
likely to affect the need for regional exchange rate stability (Table A1.2, column 6). In the European
experience (the only relevant thus far), such policies are, in our view: (2.i) the CAP; (2.ii) the use of the EU
general budget to strengthen the process of catching up in member countries such as Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain (EU structural funds). The CAP is here included due to its role as first European
common policy. Given the analytical purposes of the paper, no attention is paid to the shortcomings and
distortions related to the CAP, which is just considered in its nature as common policy (three points, of
which one in 1962 when the CAP started and two in 1964 when it was strengthened). EU transfers of
structural funds to poorer member countries are included since they may have fostered the catching-up	
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process in these countries, thus reducing their need for exchange rate adjustment. However, within EU-6
these transfers play a less important role than within EU-15. They therefore obtain 1 point in 1988, when
structural fund expenditure in the EU budget is doubled and reformed. The score assigned at the end of the
period considered is 4. The highest possible score is, however, 7, in order to signal that a TEI would involve
further unification of microeconomic policies. However, such a highest score is lower than that envisaged
for macroeconomic policies in order to signal that, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the case for
unification of microeconomic policies is weaker than that for unification of macroeconomic policies.
On the whole, an EUN as such (i.e, without considering the other stages of regional integration) would obtain 25
points. The score assigned to EU-6 is 17.
Table A1.1
INDEX OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION FOR EU-6 COUNTRIES:
SCORES GIVEN TO EACH EVENT
(N.B.: Scores envisaged by the methodology but not actually assigned to EU-6 are highlighted in italics)








Free trade area (FTA) and customs union (CU) (considered jointly)
a) FTA:
(i)  each additional reduction of tariffs by (at least) 20% implies one additional
point. However, the final step towards a FTA is weighed differently (see (iii))
(ii)  quota abolition (possible intermediate stages are not considered)
(iii)  the completion of the FTA (brings as many points as is the difference between
15 and the score achieved prior to completion (6 points, in the case of EU-6)).
(iv)  the start of the CAP in 1962 (see this Appendix, main text for an
explanation)
b) CU
(i)  each additional reduction by (at least) 20% in the difference between
average external tariffs in individual countries and the Common External
Tariffs (CETs) implies one additional point. However, the final step towards
a CU is weighed differently (see (ii))
(ii)  the completion of the CU (brings as many points as is the difference














a) Progress in abolishing non-tariff barriers:
(i)  “Dassonville” ruling of the Court of Justice (1974)









(iii)  European Single Act (1986; entered in force in 1987)
(iv)  official launch of the European Single Market (January 1993)
b) Steps in the liberalisation of the movement of capital:
(i)  restoration of currency convertibility in 1958 to allow the settlement of
current account transactions
(ii)  directive of 11 May 1960, which promotes the liberalisation of certain
capital flows and prevents member countries from introducing new
restrictions
(iii)  directive of 18 December 1962, which widens the scope for liberalisation
(iv)  directive of 21 March 1972, which goes in the opposite direction by
allowing countries to re-introduce restrictions in order to tackle the turmoil
associated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
(v)  directive of 17 November 1986, which, coupled with a less important
directive of 1985, gives new impetus to the liberalisation process
(vi)  directive of 24 June 1988, which for the first time requires the full
liberalisation of capital movements within the EU by 1 July 1990 (in 1990
the implementation of the directive is completed in the two EU-6 countries
(FR, IT) which maintained residual restrictions)
c) Measures taken to liberalise the movement of workers:
(i)  entitlement of workers to accept job offers within the internal market and
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers;
(ii)  directive of 1989 on mutual recognition of higher education diplomas;
(iii)  following the Action Plan elaborated by the Commission in 1997, policies in
the area of labour mobility have gained momentum;
(iv)  full implementation in the EU-6 area, since 1998, of the Schengen
convention of 1990 on free circulation of people;
(v)  other possible future measures (N.B.: not yet implemented. This implies that


















a) The degree of co-ordination of national macroeconomic policies:
(i)  establishment in 1958 of the Monetary Committee;
(ii)  establishment in 1964 of the Committee of Governors;
(iii)  launch of the “snake” in 1972;
(iv)  crisis of the snake since 1973;










(vi)  strengthening of the EMS in 1987, with the Basle-Nyborg agreements;
(vii)  convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty
3;
(viii)  adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997 (+3).
b) The implementation, at the regional level alongside the national level, of those
microeconomic policies which are most likely to affect the need for regional
exchange rate stability
(i)  competition policy: attribution in 1962 of strong powers to the Commission
for competition policy;
(ii)  transport policy: Commission's Action Programme on Transport Policy,
published in 1962 in order to remove obstacles on trade;
(iii)  harmonisation of VAT on trade of goods and services: the adoption of the
VAT on trade of goods and services in April 1967 (First Council Directive
No. 67/227/EEC on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States
concerning turnover taxes/VAT on trade of goods and services), which starts
the process of harmonisation;
(iv)  harmonisation of other national structural (in particular, labour market)
policies in order to increase price (in particular, labour cost) flexibility
within the region: start of the process of monitoring of structural reforms,
agreed by the European Council in Cardiff in June 1998. (N.B.: While each
of the events from (i) to (iii) brings about an actual increase in the score by
three points, the last event brings only one additional point. As a result, the
total score obtained since 1998 (10) is lower than the highest possible for an
EUN as far as microeconomic policies are concerned (12). This indicates
that, although in the EU the degree of regional integration in terms of policy
harmonisation and co-ordination is very high, some room for improvement














                                                          
3 The 1992-93 crisis as such does not add or subtract any points to the index of regional integration. The rationale for that is
that exchange rate stability in the EU was mainly pursued via foreign exchange intervention, mutual financial assistance
and so-called “credibility” of central banks prior to the crisis; and through enhanced efforts to achieve converging
fundamentals following the crisis. Differently from the snake crisis, the process of regional integration is not discontinued
in 1992-93. It is not by chance that a major adjustment of the Italian budget in September 1992 was approved a week after,
and not a week before, the lira started its fluctuation outside the ERM. This explains why the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993 and the related approval of legally binding convergence criteria imply an higher score for that year (+3)
despite the enlargement of the ERM fluctuation band to +/-15%.	
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Total economic integration (TEI)
a) The set-up of supranational institutions and decision-making processes, as well
as the structuring of the process of regional integration through laws issued and
enforced at the supranational level:
(i)  basic supranational framework already available with the Treaty of Rome (1957;
entered in force in 1958);
(ii)  establishment in 1974 of the European Council as a permanent forum providing
political impulse;
(iii)  involvement of citizens in the election of the European Parliament in 1979;
(iv)  Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999 and introduced, among
other things, an extension of qualified majority voting.
(v)  Other possible future measures (N.B. The actual score assigned at the end of the
period considered is 7. The highest possible score is, however, 9, in order to
signal that  – apart from any discussion on political union, which falls outside the
scope of the paper – even in the EU there is a clear case for strengthening the
institutional supranational aspects of the process of regional economic
integration).
b) The concrete steps towards, and the conduction of, macroeconomic policies at the
supranational level:
(i)  Achievement of a single monetary and exchange rate policy in 1999, with
the establishment of the Eurosystem and the European Central Bank;
(ii)  Event (i) was prepared in the course of the 1990s with a process sanctioned by the
Maastricht Treaty. The most important step in this process was the so-called Stage
II, which started in 1994
(iii) other possible future measures (N.B.: the actual score assigned at the end of the
period considered is 6. The highest possible score is, however, 9, in order to
signal that fiscal policies are already conducted at the national level, although
within the context of the Stability and Growth Pact).
c) Those microeconomic policies which are conducted only or mostly at a
supranational level and are most likely to affect the need for regional exchange
rate stability
(i)  the start of the CAP in 1962
and
the strengthening of CAP in 1964 (see above for an explanation);
(ii)  use of the EU general budget to strengthen the process of catching up in
member countries (EU structural funds): structural fund expenditure in the
EU budget was doubled and reformed in 1988;
(iii)  Other possible future measures (N.B. The highest possible score for c) is 7,
while the actual score at the end of the period is 4. This signals that a TEI
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Establishment of the 
Monetary Committee 
(January)
EEC Treaty of Rome and 
EURATOM Treaty enter 
in force. A number of 
objectives and 
supranational institutions 
are set up. Integration 
starts being structured 
through Community law 
(January) 
001 1 4 6
1959
The transition period for eliminating the 
internal tariffs starts. Intra-EU6 tariffs 
are reduced by 10%. They will be 
progressively eliminated between 1.1.59 
and 1.7.68. 
001 1 4 6
1960 Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 10% (July)
Directive of 11 May 
1960, which promotes 
the liberalisation of 
certain capital flows
102 1 4 8
1961
Quota restrictions lifted at the end of the 
year, with a few exceptions. Intra-EU6 
tariffs reduced by 10% (January)
502 1 4 12
1962
Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 20% (10% 
January, 10% July). In January the 
difference between average external 
tariffs in individual countries and the 
Common External Tariffs (CETs) is 
reduced by 30% (both agriculture and 
industrial products; for the latter, 
reduction had taken place already in 
1961). Start of Common Agricultural 
Policy 
Directive of 18 
December 1962, which 
widens the scope for 
capital flow 
liberalisation
Start in April of Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Strong  Commission powers 
for competition policy. The 
Commission's Action 
Programme on Transport 
Policy is published in order 
to remove obstacles on trade 
(January)
713 7 5 23
1963 Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 10% (June) 813 7 5 24
1964
Establishment of the 
Committee of 
Governors of the 
Central Banks of the 
Member Countries 
of the European 
Community
Strengthening of CAP 8 1 3 8 7 27
1965
Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 10% 
(January)
813 8 7 27
1966
Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 10%. The 
difference between average external 
tariffs in individual countries and the 
Common External Tariffs (CETs) is 
further reduced by 30% (both 
agriculture and industrial products; for 
the latter, reduction had taken place 
already in 1963) (January)
933 8 7 30
1967 Intra-EU6 tariffs reduced by 10% (July)
Directive of 11 April 1967 
on the harmonisation of 
legislation  of Member 
States concerning turnover 
taxes/VAT on trade of 
goods and services
933 1 1 7 33
1968
Customs union completed on 1 July: all 
remaining internal tariffs abolished; 
national customs duties in trade with the 
rest of the world replaced by the 
Common External Tariffs (CETs)
Workers are 
entitled to accept 







is, in principle, 
abolished
15 10 4 11 7 47
1972
Directive of 21 March 




With the Basle 
agreement, the snake 
enters into force 
(April)
15 10 2 12 7 46
1973
Italy withdraws from 
the snake (February)
15 10 2 11 7 45
1974
The European 
Court starts the 
process of 
removal of non-





from the snake 
(January)
The European Council is 
formally established 
(December)
15 10 3 11 8 47
1975
France re-enters the 
snake (July)
15 10 3 11 8 47
1976
France withdraws 
again from the snake 
(March)
15 10 3 11 8 47
1978   15 10 3 11 8 47
CO-ORDINATED OR COMMON POLICIES
INDEX OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION (score at the end of 
each yeear)
INTEGRATION OF PRODUCT, SERVICES AND 
FACTOR MARKETS



















FTA CU CM EU TEI TOTAL
1979
Cassis de Dijon ruling 
by the European 
Court of Justice 
(principle of mutual 
recognition of 
national laws affecting 
trade if such laws are 
de facto equivalent) 
(February)
The European Monetary 
System (EMS) becomes 
operational (March)
European Parliament 
elected by the Community 
citizens directly (June)
15 10 4 15 9 53
1985




removal of border 
controls for EU-6 
(excluding Italy)
15 10 4 15 9 53
1986
Directive of 17 
November 1986, which 
gives new impetus to 
the liberalisation 
process
15 10 6 15 9 55
1987
European Single Act 
in force (July)
Strengthening of the EMS 
through the Basle-Nyborg 
Agreement (September)
15 10 8 16 9 58
1988
Directive of 24 June 
1988, which completes 
the liberalisation of 
capital movement from 
1 July 1990 onwards
Doubling and reform of 
structural fund 
expenditure in the EU 
budget
15 10 8 16 10 59
1989
Directive No. 
89/48/EEC on mutual 
recognition of higher 
education diplomas. 
However, this 
directive has not 
proved sufficiently 
effective (December)




January, Italy in May. 
From July onwards free 
capital movement is 






removal of border 
controls for EU-6 
(excluding Italy) 
(June)
Start of Stage I of EMU. 
Italy enters the narrow (+/-
2.25) band within the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) of the EMS
Ex-GDR in the EU as a 
result of German 
reunification
15 10 14 16 10 65
1992




expenditure in the EU 
budget. Ceiling to EU 
budget set at 1.27% of 
Union EU GDP, to be 
possibly increased only 
by a unanimous vote. 
Reform of Common 
Agricultural Policy 
15 10 14 16 10 65
1993
Widening of the ERM band 
to +/-15%. However, with 
the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 
November, nominal 
convergence starts being 
enhanced in line with 
standardised and legally 
binding convergence criteria
The Treaty on European 
Union, signed in 
Maastricht in 1992, enters 
into force. Among other 
things, a monetary union 
shall be established by 
1.1.1999
15 10 19 19 10 73
1994
Start of Stage II of EMU. 
The European Monetary 
Institute is set up (January)




into force (excluding 
Italy)
15 10 19 19 11 74
1996 Italy re-joins ERM 15 10 19 19 11 74
1997
Commission's 
Action Plan for free 
movement of 
workers (June)
Approval by the European 
Council of the Pact for 
Stability and Growth 
(December)
15 10 20 22 11 78
1998
Since 31 March the 
Schengen 
convention is fully 
in force in all EU-6 
countries, including 
Italy
Establishment of the 
European Central Bank 
(June)
Process of monitoring 
of national structural 
reforms, agreed by the 
European Council in 
Cardiff (June)
15 10 21 23 11 80
1999
11 EU countries (including 
EU-6) start a monetary 
union (January)
The Amsterdam Treaty, 
signed in 1997, enters into 
force (extension of 
qualified majority voting, 
etc.) (January)
15 10 21 23 17 86
2001 15 10 21 23 17 86
TABLE A1.2 (continuation)
INTEGRATION OF PRODUCT, SERVICES AND FACTOR 
MARKETS
INDEX OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
(score at the end of each yeear)
The European Single Market is established on 1 January. To a very 
large extent, restrictions on factor movements are abolished. The 
process is completed by dismantlement of non-tariff barriers (e.g. on 
market access, competitive conditions and market functioning)
CO-ORDINATED OR COMMON POLICIES
Index of regional integration FOR EU-6 countries (1979 - 2001)	
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b
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p
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i
v
e
 
g
o
o
d
s
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
F
T
A
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
l
l
y
 
i
n
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
d
 
(
s
e
e
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
"
1
9
9
5
"
)
,
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
 
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
F
T
A
 
f
o
r
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
.
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
t
i
l
l
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
 
a
n
d
 
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
.
 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
 
f
o
r
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
u
t
o
m
o
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
g
a
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
f
r
e
e
 
t
r
a
d
e
.
 
M
o
r
e
o
v
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
i
a
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
i
n
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
9
 
b
r
i
n
g
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
e
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
U
:
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
9
 
t
h
e
 
C
E
T
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
y
e
t
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
g
o
o
d
s
,
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
.
 
A
s
 
a
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
,
 
e
a
c
h
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
s
 
i
t
s
 
o
w
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
 
t
o
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
g
o
o
d
s
.
 
T
a
r
i
f
f
s
 
o
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
l
a
n
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
 
a
t
 
1
4
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
1
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
o
f
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
 
a
n
d
 
b
y
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
6
 
f
o
r
 
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
 
a
n
d
 
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
.
 
F
o
r
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
l
a
n
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
 
a
t
 
1
6
 
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
6
.
 
1
1
7
3
1
2
2
4
2
0
0
0
F
T
A
:
 
S
o
m
e
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
g
o
o
d
s
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
F
T
A
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
l
l
y
 
i
n
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
d
 
(
s
e
e
 
"
1
9
9
6
"
)
,
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
 
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
F
T
A
 
a
l
s
o
 
f
o
r
 
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
 
a
n
d
 
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
1
2
7
3
1
2
2
5
2
0
0
1
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
p
a
r
t
l
y
 
a
b
a
n
d
o
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
C
E
T
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
b
y
 
e
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
s
 
o
n
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
e
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
a
i
s
i
n
g
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
t
o
 
3
5
%
.
 
T
h
e
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
s
h
i
f
t
 
o
f
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
t
o
 
a
 
d
u
a
l
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
m
p
i
n
g
e
s
 
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
.
 
1
1
6
3
1
2
2
3
5
)
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
c
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
O
n
e
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
i
s
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
J
u
n
e
 
1
9
9
9
,
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
M
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
C
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
:
 
a
)
 
i
s
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
d
r
a
f
t
i
n
g
 
n
e
w
 
m
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
c
o
-
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
f
o
r
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
m
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
n
c
e
;
 
b
)
 
e
x
p
l
o
r
e
s
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
s
 
b
o
t
h
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
h
a
r
m
o
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
 
u
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
s
o
m
e
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
 
M
o
r
e
o
v
e
r
,
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
h
e
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
H
e
a
d
s
 
o
f
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
e
n
d
o
r
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
i
d
e
a
 
o
f
 
e
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
a
 
"
m
i
n
i
-
M
a
a
s
t
r
i
c
h
t
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
"
 
f
o
r
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
n
g
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
a
s
 
a
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
e
p
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
o
n
.
 
W
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
-
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
i
n
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
b
o
d
y
 
o
f
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
-
 
a
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
 
T
h
e
s
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
c
a
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
m
a
k
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
.
U
n
d
e
r
 
R
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
N
o
.
 
9
0
/
9
5
,
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
i
s
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
G
r
o
u
p
.
 
T
h
e
s
e
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
d
e
a
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
m
a
t
t
e
r
s
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
,
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
a
g
r
e
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
,
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
,
 
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
-
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
A
1
.
3
I
N
T
E
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
 
O
F
 
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
S
 
A
N
D
 
F
A
C
T
O
R
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
I
N
D
E
X
 
O
F
 
R
E
G
I
O
N
A
L
 
I
N
T
E
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
 
(
s
c
o
r
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
e
a
r
)
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
1
9
9
1
 
-
 
2
0
0
1
)	
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A
P
P
E
N
D
I
X
 
2
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
A
2
.
1
:
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
D
e
n
d
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
E
U
1
5
 
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
5
7
-
7
0
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
6
.
2
5
1
8
3
A
T
F
R
U
K
D
K
F
I
P
T
S
E
D
E
B
E
I
E
N
D
E
S
G
R
I
T
 
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
7
1
-
7
9
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
5
.
6
2
9
0
8
A
T
D
E
D
K
S
E
B
E
N
D
F
R
U
K
I
E
E
S
P
T
F
I
G
R
I
T
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
8
0
-
8
7
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
6
.
0
7
1
2
5
A
T
B
E
I
E
N
D
D
E
F
R
I
T
D
K
S
E
E
S
F
I
U
K
G
R
P
T
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
8
8
-
9
2
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
6
.
6
2
4
5
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F
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E
F
I
B
E
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E
D
E
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E
S
U
K
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F
i
g
u
r
e
 
A
2
.
1
:
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
D
e
n
d
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
E
U
1
5
 
(
c
o
n
t
.
)
 
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
9
3
-
9
8
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
6
.
5
3
4
4
2
A
T
D
E
D
K
F
R
B
E
N
D
E
S
P
T
F
I
I
T
I
E
S
E
G
R
U
K
 
D
e
n
d
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
f
o
r
 
a
1
t
6
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
1
 
L
2
 
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
0
 
4
.
4
9
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7
8
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B
E
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G
R
I
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F
i
g
u
r
e
 
A
2
.
2
:
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
D
e
n
d
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
1
1
 
H
i
e
r
a
r
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
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